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Abstract
Background: The Europe Against Cancer programme was initiated in the late 1980s, recognising,
among other risk factors, the problematic relationship between tobacco use and cancer. In an
attempt to reduce the number of smokers in the European Community, the European Commission
proposed a ban on tobacco advertising. The question of why it took over ten years of negotiating
before the EU adopted a policy measure that could in fact improve the health situation in the
Community, can only be answered by focusing on politics.
Methods: We used an actor-centred institutionalist approach, focusing on the strategic behaviour
of the major actors involved. We concentrated our analysis on the legal basis as an important
institution and evaluated how the absence of a proper legal basis for public health measures in the
Treaties influenced policy-making, framing the discussion in market-making versus market-
correcting policy interventions. For our analysis, we used primary and secondary sources, including
policy documents, communications and press releases. We also conducted 9 semi-structured
interviews.
Results: The ban on tobacco advertising was, in essence, a public health measure. The Commission
used its agenda-setting power and framed the market-correcting proposal in market-making terms.
The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers then used the discussion on the legal basis
as a vehicle for real political controversies. After adoption of the ban on tobacco advertising,
Germany appealed to the European Court of Justice, which annulled the ban but also offered
suggestions for a possible solution with article 100a as the legal basis.
Conclusion:  The whole market-making versus market-correcting discussion is related to a
broader question, namely how far European health regulation can go in respect to the member
states. In fact, the policy-making process of a tobacco advertising ban, as described in this paper, is
related to the 'constitutional' foundation of health policy legislation in the Community. The absence
of a clear-cut legal basis for health policies does not imply that the EU's impact on health is
negligible. In the case of tobacco-control measures, the creative use of other Treaty bases has
resulted in significant European action in the field of public health.
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Background
Since the launch of the Europe against Cancer (EAC) pro-
gramme in 1987, diverse tobacco control measures have
been introduced: a ban on tobacco advertising on televi-
sion (89/552/EEC), tobacco labelling (89/622/EEC and
92/41/EEC), tar maximums for cigarettes (90/239/EEC)
and minimum tax levels for tobacco products (92/12/
EEC, 92/79/EEC and 95/59/EEC) [1]. Most contentious
was, without any doubt, the ban on tobacco advertising.
Its adoption in 1998 took almost ten years of negotiation,
but even after the final decision in the European Parlia-
ment (EP) and the Council of Ministers, the process did
not end there. In 2000, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) annulled the directive after an appeal made by Ger-
many and a few other opponents. Following this ruling,
the Commission came up with a new proposal in 2001
that was approved by the EP and the Council in 2003.
Despite the restricted scope of the new directive, Germany
appealed again.
The ban on tobacco advertising proved politically contro-
versial. For instance, Denmark argued that it conflicted
with freedom of speech, whereas other countries includ-
ing Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands
as well as Denmark considered regulations on tobacco
advertisements a national competence. These countries
had a tradition of minimal state intervention in the pri-
vate sphere of consumption and preferred voluntary
agreements with the tobacco industry [1]. Germany even
declared the ban unconstitutional. At a deeper level, how-
ever, there was a more fundamental conflict between the
interests of public health and economic interests. Advo-
cates of a ban on tobacco advertising argued that it would
reduce the number of smokers, since advertising pro-
moted the idea of tobacco as a legitimate and socially
acceptable product. Opponents of the ban put forward the
argument that advertising did not affect the number of
smokers. According to them, advertising was necessary for
companies to encourage brand building [2]. A ban would
also hurt the tobacco and advertisement industry and,
therefore, have a negative impact on the labour market.
The costs of harmonisation would be centred on Ger-
many, the UK and the Netherlands as the major tobacco
manufacturing countries. Thus, there was not only contro-
versy regarding the welfare aspects of the ban (does it gen-
erate health gains?), but also, and perhaps more
importantly, about its distributional economic impact.
In this article, we analyse the policy-making process of the
tobacco advertising ban, focusing on the legal basis. Every
piece of legislation enacted by the Community must have
a correct legal basis in the Treaties. The Commission
framed the ban as a market-making policy intervention
directed at removing barriers to foster market competition
and free movement. Opponents of the ban claimed that it
was not a market-making, but a market-correcting policy
intervention, for which there was no legal basis. In fact,
different actors used the legal basis as a vehicle for real
political controversies. In order to understand why it was
so difficult to adopt a policy measure that could in fact
improve the health situation in the European Union (EU)
[2-4], we claim it is necessary to focus upon the political
sphere [5]. We will show that the political controversy
regarding the tobacco advertising ban, to a great extent,
concentrated upon the question of whether or not it had
a correct legal basis. Although our main focus concerns
the annulled Directive 98/43/EC, we will also provide an
analysis of the discussion on the legal basis for Directive
2003/33/EC.
Methods
Our analysis is based upon the framework of actor-cen-
tred institutionalism [6]. The starting-point of this type of
policy analysis is that institutions – defined as the set of
'formal and informal rules of the game that structure the
course of action that actors may choose' [6] – influence
policy-making processes and their outcomes. Institutions
do not have a determinative impact upon the activities of
the actors involved. They constrain or facilitate strategic
options, but do not determine them [7]. In other words,
institutions only create a set of strategic options for actors,
but how they use them depends upon their preferences
and their assessment of the consequences of the strategic
options available. In fact, one may conceptualise the use
of institutions as a strategic game in itself [6].
From a problem-solving perspective, institutions are
important. They have a strong impact on whether or not
an agreement can be reached and, therefore, on the prob-
lem-solving capacity of an institutional setting. For
instance, if agreement between actors is difficult, the rule
of unanimity is likely to block the policy-making process,
because each actor has a veto position. Voting by qualified
majority would offer a way out of this deadlock. In a sim-
ilar way, one can conceptualise the introduction of the co-
decision procedure in the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) as an important institutional change. It implied a
significant alteration of the rules of the game governing
the relationships between the Council, the Commission
and the EP with far reaching consequences for European
policy-making [8]. In this article, we analyse how the
institutional structure affected the political controversy on
the ban on tobacco advertising. What happened within
member states falls outside the scope of this article, as
does the (strategic) behaviour of interest groups [9].
For this study, an extensive search and analysis were car-
ried out of both data from primary and secondary sources.
Our data collection started with a literature review of EU
policy-making in general, as well as policy-related studies.BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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This included the archives of the Dutch Ministry of Health
and policy documents originating from the Commission,
the Council and the EP. We also analysed documents
from the European Bureau for Action on smoking Preven-
tion and the European Cancer Leagues. Tobacco industry
documents were available on the internet as a result of the
1998 Master Settlement Agreement between 46 United
States state attorneys general and the industry. Publica-
tions from the press agency 'Agence Europe' also proved a
useful source of information.
During the period between April 2005 and March 2006,
in-depth, taped, semi-structured interviews were held
with nine persons who were all intensively involved in the
policy-making process. We used the results of our docu-
ment analysis to identify persons who were asked for an
interview. The 'snowball effect' provided us with other rel-
evant actors (see appendix). We began each interview with
a very general question: 'What was your role in the nego-
tiating process concerning....?' This allowed the interview-
ees to give an open answer before specific questions
related to strategic behaviour were asked. The fact that the
revised Directive 2003/33/EC (adopted in 2003) was then
still pending in the ECJ, proved a complicating factor.
Discussion: market-making versus market-correcting 
interventions
Policy interventions with respect to the European market
can be divided into two analytical categories: market-mak-
ing and market-correcting interventions. Market-making
interventions are directed at the removal of barriers to
trade and competition, including the abolishment of tar-
iffs and other quantitative restrictions, as well as the estab-
lishment of common product standards. Another purpose
of these interventions is to establish a common level play-
ing field for all market players. From the market-making
perspective, all factors that distort the market process
must be removed. Market-correcting interventions have a
restrictive impact on the domain of competition. Policy-
makers implement such interventions in order to avoid
market effects they consider deviant or anomalous, such
as ethical reasons or considerations related to social wel-
fare and public health. A ban on market instruments, such
as advertising, can also be interpreted as a market-correct-
ing intervention if that intervention aims at avoiding
unwanted market effects. The distinction between market-
making and market-correcting policy interventions
should be understood as an analytical one. In fact, many
policies combine aspects of both and a clear-cut distinc-
tion does not always exist. Yet, it is useful for our research
topic to differentiate between interventions directed at the
creation of a market and interventions that pose restric-
tions to the market process for moral, social or other rea-
sons.
How did the Commission's proposal for a ban on tobacco
advertising fit into the distinction between market-mak-
ing and market-correcting? The Commission based the
tobacco advertising proposal on article 100a, arguing that
its aim was to ensure the free movement of newspapers,
magazines and other publications that was hindered by
differences in national regulatory regimes.
Yet, the Commission's argument was artificial, because it
was evident that the whole idea of a European ban on
tobacco advertising originated from the 'Europe against
Cancer' programme [10,11]. In our view, the tobacco
advertising ban should be understood as a market-correct-
ing intervention rather than a market-making one. It was
not directed – or at least not primarily – at the removal of
trade barriers, or the establishment of a common level
playing field, but instead at the promotion of public
health. What the Commission did was to frame an essen-
tially market-correcting policy intervention as a market-
making one. This observation raises important questions.
Why did the Commission do so? How did the controversy
about the true nature of the ban influence the strategies of
the major players involved? How did the annulment of
the ban by the ECJ impact upon the course of the policy-
making process? These questions will be dealt with in the
next sections.
Results
I. The legal basis: political interpretation
Within EU policy-making, an important institution is that
policy interventions must have a correct legal basis.
According to the ECJ, the choice of the legal basis should
be a matter of principle and not a matter of political prag-
matism [12]. Was this indeed the case? In this section we
will show that the Commission's strategic choice for arti-
cle 100a as the proposal's legal basis generated much
political controversy in the Council and the EP.
The European Commission: in search for a legal basis
When the Commission came up with its first proposal for
a directive on tobacco advertising in 1989 [13], it had a
limited scope. The proposal did not impose a ban, but
only included restrictions to advertising. Although the pro-
posal was clearly motivated by the ambitious goals of the
EAC programme, the Commission's principal argument
was that the removal of all obstacles to trade by 1992
required the harmonisation of national regulations at the
European level, including those on tobacco advertising.
Differences in national regulations hindered the free
movement of tobacco advertising publications. Whereas
Portugal and Italy had implemented a total ban, Belgium,
Ireland and Luxembourg had only banned advertising in
publications directed at young people. Spain, Denmark,
the UK and the Netherlands opted for partial restrictionsBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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based on legislation, or voluntary agreements with the
tobacco industry.
The 1989 'restricting' proposal: Advertising for
tobacco products in the press and by means of bills
and posters should carry health warnings. The content
of the advertising message is restricted to information
about the product (tar, nicotine yields etc.) and a pres-
entation of its packaging. Advertising in publications
intended for people under 18 years is not permitted.
Indirect advertising is prohibited. Member states can
adopt additional restrictions. Publications or the dis-
play of bills which comply with this directive cannot
be prohibited.
After the Commission had tabled the 1989 proposal, the
EP gave its opinion during first reading under the cooper-
ation procedure. The Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection (the ENVI Com-
mittee) advised the plenary to amend the proposal by ask-
ing for a total ban.
During the plenary meeting, most members of the Parlia-
ment (MEPs) emphasised the public health aspect of the
Commission's proposal and regarded the suggested
amendments for a total ban as an improvement for public
health. The market-making argument regarding establish-
ing an internal market for tobacco advertising hardly
played a role. Only the European People's Party (EPP)
argued that a ban lacked a legal basis in the Treaty and,
therefore, fell outside the scope of the Community.
The Commission accepted the Parliament's principal
amendment for a ban on tobacco advertising in its pro-
posal tabled in 1991 [14]. Policy developments in some
member states had encouraged the Commission to
replace its proposal for restrictions to tobacco advertising
with a ban on tobacco advertising. Public regulations in
Belgium and Greece had become more restrictive and
France had even adopted a ban on tobacco advertising.
The 1991 'banning' proposal: Direct as well as indirect
advertising for tobacco products are banned within
the Community. Free distribution of tobacco products
is not allowed. Member states can authorise advertis-
ing within tobacco sales outlets, provided it is not vis-
ible from outside the premises.
The Commission's original proposal restricting advertise-
ments (1989) and its new proposal banning tobacco
advertising (1991) were both based upon article 100a.
The Commission stipulated that the main goal of these
proposals was to reinforce the functioning of the internal
market, although it was clear right from the beginning
that they also served a public health purpose. One may
argue that the market-making argument made by the
Commission could be justified under the condition that
the proposal only contained restrictions to tobacco adver-
tising. The diversity in national regulations on tobacco
advertising could indeed hinder international trade. Fol-
lowing this reasoning, harmonisation by means of adopt-
ing restrictions to advertising would improve the free
movement of publications.
However, when the Commission introduced a ban on
tobacco advertising, its argument became seriously
flawed. As one of our interviewees explained, "If [there
are] advertisements for tobacco in a German cinema, what
does it have to do with the internal market? What about
posters in Bonn or Berlin? [They have] nothing to do with
the internal market" (#1, German civil servant). The pro-
posal's principal purpose became combating smoking,
instead of harmonising national regulations.
Why then, did the Commission choose article 100a as the
legal basis for the 1991 proposal? Prior to the TEU, the
Community lacked any specific authority to develop pol-
icies that had public health protection as their 'principal
or sole justification'. However, 'the Single European Act
(SEA) made it possible to piggy-back health considera-
tions onto the development of the single market' [15],
because it recognised health as a dimension of economic
integration. The vague language of the SEA enabled the
Commission to take action in the public health sphere.
The formulation of the proposal required creative word-
ing, due to the lack of an explicit public health compe-
tence. The choice for article 100a implied that the
principal objective had to be the establishment and func-
tioning of the internal market. The Commission also
referred to paragraph 3, of article 100a, according to
which, the Commission should take a high level of protec-
tion of health as a basis for its proposals concerning the
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
However, the Commission's interpretation of this para-
graph was ambiguous. It required the Commission to take
health protection into account when developing policy
interventions directed at the removal of obstacles to trade.
It did not imply that 'a high level of protection of health'
could be taken as the main objective of a policy interven-
tion. In other words, 'a high level of protection of health'
should be interpreted as a secondary policy, not as a pol-
icy objective in itself.
In fact, the Commission believed it had no real alterna-
tives to article 100a. It took until 1993, before the Com-
munity was given a legal competence in the field of public
health. Article 129 of the TEU (now article 152) gave the
EU a mandate to 'encourage cooperation between mem-
ber states and, if necessary, lend support to their actions'.
However, article 129 excluded harmonisation of laws andBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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regulations in member states and, therefore, could never
provide a legal basis for the tobacco advertising ban. The
only alternative was article 235 (now article 308), which
provided the Commission with the room to act in circum-
stances where action by the Community was necessary,
even though no legal basis existed. However, article 235
required decision-making by unanimity in the Council
and decreased the role of the EP, which now only needed
to be consulted. Given the diverging preferences in the
Council, the Commission did not consider this feasible.
Article 100a was considered to be the only option,
because decisions based upon it could be taken by quali-
fied majority voting (QMV). Thus, the choice for article
100a was a strategic one. It reflected the Commission's
assessment that the 'article 235 route' was likely to fail,
because of the impossibility of reaching political consen-
sus on a ban.
The Commission's strategy came at a price. A key problem
was that an essentially market-correcting policy interven-
tion had to be framed in terms of a market-making inter-
vention. This problem proved a source of fundamental
tensions that played a significant role during policy-mak-
ing.
The Council of Ministers
The QMV rule enabled countries opposing the ban to
block agreement for many years. Germany, the UK, the
Netherlands, Greece and Denmark renounced the ban
"for purely economic reasons" (#1, German civil servant).
The interests of the tobacco and advertising industry
apparently prevailed over public health interests.
The Commission's choice for article 100a as the legal basis
of the tobacco advertising ban influenced negotiations in
the Council. The Council's legal service concluded that
article 100a provided an appropriate legal basis for the
proposal on restricting  tobacco advertising. Differences
between national regulations caused a distortion of com-
petition. Resorting to restrictions on tobacco advertising,
instead of imposing a ban, would leave media free to cir-
culate in the internal market under given conditions.
The legal service also examined the proposal for a ban on
tobacco advertising, concluding that the ban 'cannot be
regarded as having the effect of harmonizing national pro-
visions relating to the establishment and functioning of
the internal market. The provision covers purely domestic
situations and is designed to protect public health'. In
other words, the legal service held the opinion that the
ban could not be based on any Treaty article.
This opinion was obviously good news for the opponents
of the ban, using it as an important argument to obstruct
its acceptance. For example, the Belgian Minister of
Health exploited the conclusions of the Council's legal
service to distort the Health Council meeting – undermin-
ing her role as president to facilitate the negotiating proc-
ess during the second half of 1993. In fact, the Belgian
government was in favour of the proposal, but the Belgian
Health Minister personally did not show any commit-
ment. The discussion in the health working group was
based on an informal paper, which proposed a ban, but
delayed its implementation until 1998. The Belgian
Health Minister had not approved the paper and had no
intention of pursuing the dossier. However, the Commis-
sion decided to reinstate the item on the Council's agenda
[16]. During the following Council meeting, the Belgian
Minister cited the opinion of the legal service and
returned the proposal to the working group without even
a 'tour de table' [17].
Germany tabled a compromise proposal in 1994 during
its presidency, limiting the scope of the original proposal
to cross-border advertising. The German government held
that this was the only possibility under article 100a. Indi-
rect advertising and sponsoring were excluded, thus
reducing the scope of the proposal. The UK and the Neth-
erlands had principal objections. They maintained their
earlier position that tobacco advertising regulation at the
European level conflicted with article 100a and the princi-
ple of subsidiarity.
An important event took place in May 1997, when the
new UK government rejected all the earlier fundamental
objections of the previous government. A similar develop-
ment occurred in the Netherlands. In 1993, the Dutch
government decided to reconsider its point of view in case
its vote was decisive, which after the policy change by the
UK, was indeed the case. Only a few days before the
Health Council meeting in December 1997, the Dutch
government decided to vote in favour of the ban. It had
always used the ambiguity of the legal basis as a reason to
oppose the ban, referring to the opinion of the Council's
legal service. Yet, in the final negotiating stage, it reasoned
that the legal service of the Commission had expressed a
contradictory view. The Dutch Health Minister told the
national Parliament that the issue of the legal basis was
for the ECJ to sort out.
Thus, member states in favour of the ban on tobacco
advertising based their position on the belief that further
restrictions to tobacco advertising were required to reduce
the harmful effect of smoking on public health. Member
states opposing the ban gave priority to their economic
interests. The controversy over the legal basis and the
opinion of the Council's legal service offered them an
opportunity to renounce the ban and obstruct the policy-
making process without the need to refer to their eco-
nomic interests. "Most legal arguments, especially thoseBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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regarding competence, were just smoke screens for coun-
tries who wanted to block the ban" (#1, German civil serv-
ant).
The European Parliament
Whereas the legal basis of the original proposal restricting
tobacco advertising was hardly an issue in the EP, it
became a major point of discussion during the debate on
the proposal for the tobacco advertising ban. The ENVI
Committee, which was responsible for the report, sup-
ported the proposal. The rapporteur explicitly expressed
his support for the Commission's choice of article 100a as
the proposals' legal basis.
In February 1992, the EP plenary gave its opinion on this
issue [18]. The EPP and the Economic and Monetary
Affairs and Industrial Policy Committee tabled amend-
ments to change the legal basis, seeking to replace article
100a with article 235. All MEPs knew that under article
235, decisions had to be made by unanimity. The rappor-
teur from the ENVI Committee called this 'a deceitful
attempt to sweep the text from the table' [19]. Despite the
expressions of doubt regarding the legal basis, the plenary
rejected the motion to replace article 100a with article 235
(150 votes in favour; 123 against; and 12 abstentions).
The head of the ENVI Committee stated that 'the people
who wanted to change the legal basis lost. Now what we
are seeing is (...) an attempt to delay the proceedings. This
is plain filibustering and it is a plain abuse of the demo-
cratic process' [20].
After the Council reached its common position in 1997,
the EP had to give its opinion in its second reading. In a
final attempt to obstruct the adoption of the ban on
tobacco advertising, opponents once again concentrated
on amending the legal basis. Many documents addressing
the legal basis of the ban circulated in the EP. For example,
the confederation of European Community Cigarette
Manufacturers (CECCM) published a report declaring
that the EP was permitted to, and should discuss and
amend the legal basis [21]. The International Union
against Cancer and the Association of European Cancer
Leagues framed the ban as a market-making intervention,
stating that article 100a was correct and that differences
between member states in regulation of advertising and
sponsorship impeded the proper functioning of the inter-
nal market [22].
Several (mostly German) MEPs started to raise questions
about the legal basis of the Council's common position.
For example, Schleicher (EPP, Germany) suggested article
129 as the proper legal basis, since it was generally
acknowledged that the directive pursued a health policy
objective. In its answer, the Council said that it 'took great
pains to produce a text which took into account both the
efficient operation of the internal market, and the require-
ments of ensuring a high level of health protection. (...)
The Court of Justice is competent to interpret the meas-
ures and to ensure that they comply with the Treaty' [23].
Another example was the question to the Council issued
by Jackson (EPP, UK), focusing on the opinion of the
Council legal service. '(...) Could the Council explain how
the provisions of the current proposal are so different
from the 1992 draft as to make the legal service's opinion
no longer applicable?' The Council responded that the
legal service assisted the Council in its deliberations by
providing independent legal advice, which was only an
internal document [24]. Finally, Florenz (EPP, Germany)
asked the Commission what justified its choice for article
100a as the legal basis. The Commission answered that it
considered the legal basis sufficient and appropriate [25].
In March 1998, the EP's legal service confirmed the legal
basis of the common position. It did not question the
Community's competence to rule on the matter. On the
contrary, it felt that action at European level was neces-
sary, but suggested that the legal basis could be strength-
ened by complementing article 100a with article 57
paragraph 2 (now article 47(2)) and article 66 (now arti-
cle 55). The latter empowered the Council to adopt direc-
tives in order to facilitate the exercise of freedom of
establishment, and freedom to provide services [26].
The ENVI Committee delivered its opinion in April 1998
[27]. The Committee had heard an oral statement from
the Legal Affairs Committee, which had issued a report on
its own initiative disputing the competency of the EU to
adopt a ban on tobacco advertising. By a mixed view (12
votes in favour; 7 against and 3 abstentions), it concluded
that the EU had no legal basis on which to act, because
there was no distortion of competition, but only the abo-
lition of an activity. However, the Parliaments' legal serv-
ice insisted on article 100a as the correct legal basis.
Considering the EP's legal service as a body of technical
experts instead of politicians who populated the Legal
Affairs Committee, the proposal based on article 100a
received a go-ahead from the ENVI Committee.
In May 1998, the ban on tobacco advertising was debated
in the EP plenary [28], which was divided in two groups.
One group was committed to public health, the other to
economic interests. The plenary debate again focused on
the legal basis. Several MEPs argued that the directive had
the correct basis. 'The legal services of Parliament, the
Commission and the Council say that article 100a is the
correct basis. It is clearly an issue of the internal market'.
Opponents claimed that 'since Maastricht, there has been
article 129 which calls on us to promote public health and
the route for those who want to ban tobacco advertising isBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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article 129 of the Treaty.' One MEP argued that 'the legal
instruments being advanced by the tobacco industry
through a skilfully orchestrated lobbying campaign seem
intended to evade the debate on the substance of the mat-
ter by replacing it with a debate on procedure. (...) Let the
Court of Justice decide on the issue of the legal basis, if it
is referred to them. That is their right'. The discussion on
the legal basis was also called subterfuge: 'When people
say we should use article 129, they forget that, according
to that article, it is not possible to adopt measures to har-
monise the member states' legal and statutory provisions.
So it is just a subterfuge, so much so, that we think there
has been an attempt to devalue the position of the Coun-
cil'.
Despite the discussion on the legal basis, the EP voted in
favour of the Council's common position in May 1998.
Directive 98/43/EC was finally adopted in July 1998.
II. The legal basis: juridical interpretation
Germany had blocked the proposal for a tobacco advertis-
ing ban from the very beginning for economic reasons.
After having been outvoted in the Council, it decided to
appeal to the ECJ. In addition to the German government,
Salamander AG (Germany), owning the Camel Boots
trade mark, Una Film (Austria), distributing cinema
tobacco advertising films, Alma Media Group (Greece),
selling advertising space in public places, and Davidoff
(Switzerland), holding the Davidoff trade mark for
tobacco products as well as products outside the tobacco
sector, also challenged the tobacco advertising directive
before the ECJ. However, the Court of First Instance dis-
missed their cases, not recognising them as interested par-
ties [29].
If the directive would have been adopted by unanimity,
one may assume that no government would have an inter-
est in challenging it. Given the fact that only interested
parties, (those whose legal situation is influenced directly
by the consequences of the directive and the institutions
which have given birth to the directive), can bring pro-
ceedings, the list of potential plaintiffs is more narrow
under unanimity. Thus, QMV increases the chance of liti-
gation before the ECJ, as member states opposing adop-
tion may seek to enforce their point of view by judicial
means. The decision of the German government to chal-
lenge Directive 98/43/EC created a new institutional set-
ting with the ECJ as arbiter. The interaction mode thus
shifted from joint decisions under QMV, to hierarchical
direction, centralising competences at supranational level
through an ECJ ruling [30,31].
The European Court of Justice ruling on Directive 98/43/EC
The debate thus continued via another route. The German
government put forward several reasons why the EU was
not competent to adopt the measure [32], with its main
argument based on an inappropriate legal basis. Follow-
ing its argument that tobacco advertising is essentially an
activity of which the effects do not extend beyond the bor-
ders of individual member states, differences in national
legislation did not result in distortion of competition. In
fact, a ban would allegedly counteract trade instead of
facilitating it, by creating new obstacles that did not exist
previously.
The Commission, the EP and the Council, joined by
France, Finland and the UK, argued that cross-border
trade in services and goods in tobacco advertising existed.
A Community-wide measure was required because differ-
ences in national regulations could be regarded as an
obstacle to free trade. They maintained that article 100a
also permitted internal market regulation without a liber-
alising effect: 'the power conferred on the Council by that
provision is not necessarily concerned with the liberalisa-
tion of trade, but rather with market regulation. That
explains why it has been possible for directives containing
certain prohibitions to be adopted on the basis of article
100a' (para 45). The Commission also argued that there
was, in fact, a real distortion of competition. 'Because of
existing differences in legislation, the potential profit of
advertising agencies differs according to the (...) market in
which they carry on business' (para 51). According to the
defendants, the essential factor in assessing the choice of
the legal basis was the text of the measure in question.
They argued that human health was one of the directives'
objectives, but not the principal one. 'The emphasis on
public health protection in the directive can be explained
by the fact that it constituted the main (...) objective of the
national measures being harmonised, but, in the context
of harmonisation, it became a secondary objective' (para
56). Finally, all defendants referred to paragraph 3 of arti-
cle 100a: '(...) a broad prohibition on tobacco advertising
derives from the obligation imposed by article 100a(3)'
(para 57).
The ECJ stated that the explicit exclusion of harmonisa-
tion in article 129 meant the directive could not be based
on that particular provision. 'But that provision does not
mean that harmonising measures adopted on the basis of
other provisions of the Treaty cannot have any impact on
the protection of human health. Indeed, the third para-
graph of article 129(1) provides that health requirements
are to form a constituent part of the Community's other
policies. Other articles of the Treaty may not, however, be
used as a legal basis in order to circumvent the express
exclusion of harmonisation laid down in article 129(4) of
the Treaty' (para 78–79). 'Provided that the conditions for
recourse to articles 100a, 57(2) and 66 as a legal basis are
fulfilled, the Community legislature cannot be prevented
from relying on that legal basis on the grounds that publicBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be
made' (para 88). The ECJ therefore had to examine
whether the directive actually contributed to eliminating
obstacles to the free movement of goods and services, and
removing appreciable distortions of competition.
With regard to the elimination of obstacles to free move-
ment, the Court ruled that the directive did not improve
the functioning of the internal market. The prohibition
imposed by the directive was too general because it con-
cerned all forms of advertising. Some forms, in particular,
static advertising media, were not cross-bordering in
nature.
On what concerns elimination of distortion of competi-
tion, 'in examining the lawfulness of a directive adopted
on the basis of article 100a of the Treaty, the Court is
required to verify whether the distortion of competition,
which the measure purports to eliminate is appreciable. In
the absence of such a requirement, the powers of the
Community legislature would be practically unlimited'
(para 106). In this case, the Court argued that the distor-
tions were not considered to be sufficiently appreciable to
accept an absolute prohibition of advertising and spon-
sorship. Based on these findings, the ECJ annulled the
directive. Traditionally, the main way in which the Court
influenced the development of the Community has been
through an expansive interpretation of Community com-
petences. It was the first time the ECJ ruled that the EU did
not have the competence to adopt a measure [12].
Directive 2003/33/EC: banning cross-border advertising and 
sponsorship
Interestingly however, the Court went a step further by
offering a way out. It formulated guidelines as to what
would be a legally acceptable policy. The Court argued
that the trend towards more restrictions to tobacco adver-
tising in national regulations might lead to obstacles to
the free movement of press products. 'In principle, there-
fore, a directive prohibiting the advertising of tobacco
products in periodicals, magazines and newspapers could
be adopted on the basis of article 100a' (para 98). A simi-
lar argument could be valid for certain forms of sponsor-
ship. With these statements, the Court made an indirect
contribution to policy-making [26] which strongly influ-
enced the further course of the process. The problem-solv-
ing intervention of the Court opened the possibility for a
new proposal by the Commission, introduced a year after
the annulment [33].
The '2001' proposal Advertising for tobacco products
in press and other printed publications are limited to
publications intended exclusively for professionals in
the tobacco trade and publications printed in third
countries which are not principally for the Commu-
nity market. Advertising not permitted in the press and
other printed publications shall not be permitted on
the internet. All forms of radio advertising and spon-
sorship shall be forbidden. Also other forms of spon-
sorship with cross-border effects shall be prohibited.
Member states shall not prohibit or restrict free move-
ment of products or services that comply with the
directive.
The proposal had the same legal basis as the annulled
Directive 98/43/EC (now, after amendment, article 95).
However, the Commission made sure to emphasise the
market-making element of the directive. Again the Com-
mission reasoned that differences between national legis-
lation result in barriers of free movement between
member states for products and advertising related serv-
ices. For sponsorship, distortion of competition was likely
to increase. As member states were heading towards
increasingly stringent advertising restrictions, harmonisa-
tion could only be logically based on a ban. However, this
time the scope of the proposal was limited to advertising
and sponsorship with a cross-border effect. Indirect adver-
tising, as well as those elements of advertising with no
cross-border effect, fell outside the scope of the proposal.
Whereas in the previous process the ENVI Committee was
responsible for the report on the proposal, in this case the
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market
drafted the report for the EP [34]. It took 18 months to
come up with 25 amendments, which according to mem-
bers of the ENVI Committee, could 'lead to further annul-
ment by the Court of Justice and which restrict the scope
of the directive still further' [35].
The ENVI Committee, though not the prime responsible
committee anymore, gave its opinion on the Commission
proposal: 'the new proposal is much more modest in
terms of protection of public health. (...) Studies have
been carried out on the effects of partial or total advertis-
ing bans on the consumption of tobacco products. They
have shown that partial advertising bans have only lim-
ited effects on smoking, since the industry can easily
switch to advertising in other media. On the contrary,
comprehensive bans on the advertising and promotion of
tobacco products, covering all media and all uses of brand
names and logos have proved to be significantly effective
in reducing smoking' [34]. The ENVI Committee consid-
ered the Commission's proposal 'extremely disappointing
from the point of view of health protection' [34], but the
debate did not take place in a vacuum and the EU compe-
tence to adopt legislation should be taken into account.
Therefore the proposal 'goes as far as possible. (...) Any
amendment seeking to introduce new elements empha-
sizing the public health aspects would de facto undermine
the appropriateness of the legal basis' [34].BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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During the debate in the EP [35], responsible Commis-
sioner Byrne expressed his disappointment with the slow
progress on the proposal: 'There have been delaying tac-
tics, misinformation and, very often, misleading state-
ments. It is a great pity that the Committee on Legal
Affairs and the Internal Market was unable to work more
quickly, in contrast to the much quicker Committee on
the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy,
whose members are the true experts in the EP. (...) I make
no secret of the fact that I would have preferred to present
a proposal for a complete ban (...). But, unfortunately, the
legal framework does not allow us to go that far. (...) We
have to recognise the legal constraints'.
In general, the discussion in the EP focused on the ECJ rul-
ing and the question as to whether this new proposal
indeed had a Treaty basis. For example, both German
MEP Lechner (EPP) and Berger (PSE) argued that most
publications simply had no cross-border effect. 'I believe
this question of law to be eminently political in nature
(...). We should be putting down a marker, and as legisla-
tors ourselves, respecting the powers of our counterparts
in the national parliament, rather than again leaving this
matter to the ECJ' (Lechner). However, in November
2002, the EP passed the watered-down proposal with 309
votes in favour, 203 votes against and 39 abstentions [36].
Once at the Council, agreement was reached on 2 Decem-
ber 2002 [33]. Again, two member states voted against the
directive: the UK and Germany. Paradoxically, the UK had
just passed a ban on tobacco advertising in November
2002. After a positive vote on the annulled Directive 98/
43/EC, the UK voted against Directive 2003/33/EC, claim-
ing that the text was too weak. It remains unclear whether
this is the real argument, or whether the British govern-
ment wanted to please some domestic constituents, with
the knowledge that the directive would be adopted any-
how [1].
European Court of Justice ruling on Directive 2003/33/EC
After the adoption of Directive 2003/33/EC, the German
government asked the ECJ to annul articles 3 and 4 [37],
covering a ban on advertising in the press and printed
publications, except those intended exclusively for profes-
sionals in the tobacco trade and printed in third countries
not principally intended for the Community market; a
ban on advertising on the internet for those advertise-
ments that are not allowed in press and printed publica-
tions; and a ban on radio advertising and sponsorship.
The German government put forward five pleas in law in
support of its action: article 95 (previously article 100a)
was not the appropriate legal basis; the directive was
adopted in breach of article 152(4) (previously article
129(4)). In addition, Germany also argued that there was
a breach of duty to state reasons, of the rules governing the
co-decision procedure, and infringement of the principle
of proportionality. Whereas Directive 98/43/EC was only
challenged on its legal basis, it seems that in this case, Ger-
many searched for additional reasons to strengthen its
position. However, in the light of settled case law, these
grounds are very difficult to succeed.
Firstly, the German government held that none of the pro-
hibitions laid down in article 3 and 4 of the directive con-
tributed to eliminating obstacles to the free movement of
goods, or to removing appreciable distortions of competi-
tions. It claimed that there was hardly any cross-border
trade of printed publications, consultation on the internet
of printed publications from other member states was
marginal and the limited range of transmitters implied
that radio programmes addressed to the public in a local-
ity or region could not be picked up elsewhere. 'The true
purpose of those prohibitions is not to improve the con-
ditions for the establishment and functioning of the inter-
nal market, but solely to protect public health' (para 24).
The EP and the Council, supported by Spain, Finland,
France and the Commission, disputed all these argu-
ments.
The Court examined whether this new directive con-
formed to the criteria set in the previous case on Directive
98/43/EC. The three determining factors used to decide
whether the new directive was legitimately based on arti-
cle 95 included the need to harmonise, a favourable inter-
nal market purpose and a favourable internal market
effect. The possibility that the directive also had a public
health protection goal did not matter as long as there was
also a market-making element. The Court used the same
wording as in the previous case (see para 88): 'Provided
that the conditions for recourse to article 95 EC as a legal
basis are fulfilled, the Community legislature cannot be
prevented from relying on that legal basis on the grounds
that public health protection is a decisive factor in the
choices to be made' (para 39).
The Court argued that disparities between national laws
on tobacco advertising did indeed exist and resulted in
legal obstacles to trade. The Court then examined whether
article 3 and 4 were in reality designed to eliminate or pre-
vent obstacles to the free movement of goods, the free-
dom to provide services or to remove distortions of
competition. Given that article 8 of the directive prevents
member states from prohibiting or restricting free move-
ment of products and the freedom to provide services that
comply with this directive, 'article 8 of the directive gives
expression to the objective laid down in article 1(2) of
improving the conditions for the functioning of the inter-
nal market' (para 74). Therefore article 95 was the correctBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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legal basis of the directive and the Court dismissed this
plea.
Germany also maintained that article 152(4) laying down
the prohibition on any harmonisation of the laws and reg-
ulations of the member states in the field of public health
was circumvented, because the true purpose of the direc-
tive was public health. The Parliament and the Council
argued that that the conditions for recourse to article 95
were fulfilled and that this could not prevent them from
taking measures that also had an impact on the protection
public health. Since the Court had already ruled that the
directive had the correct legal basis and explained in par-
agraph 39 that this directive could have both a market-
making and market-correcting effect, the second plea was
dismissed as well.
Thirdly, the German government asked for annulment,
arguing that the requirement to show clearly and unequiv-
ocally the reasons for the measures adopted, as laid down
in article 253 of the Treaty, were not fulfilled. However,
the Court disagreed and stated that the 'recitals clearly dis-
close the essential objective pursued by the Community
legislature' (para 114). The fourth argument concerned
infringement of the co-decision procedure. Germany
stated that amendments were made by the Council to arti-
cle 10 and 11 of the directive without approval of the EP.
However, the Court determined that 'by the present
action, the applicant seeks to call into question the valid-
ity of articles 3 and 4 of the directive alone' (para 124),
therefore, this plea necessarily needed to be dismissed.
Finally, Germany tried to show that the prohibitions of
article 3 and 4 'seriously compromise fundamental rights
in the economic sectors concerned' (para 130), referring
to the freedom of the press and of expression. The Council
and the Parliament explained that these fundamental
rights may 'be subject to certain restrictions or penalties,
prescribed by law, which are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of the protection of health or mor-
als' (para 141). The ECJ ruled that article 3 and 4 'may be
regarded as measures appropriate for achieving the objec-
tive they pursue' (para 146) and therefore also dismissed
this plea. Thus, Germany lost its appeal for annulment of
articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2003/33/EC.
Conclusion
The question why it took so many years of negotiation
before the EU adopted a policy measure that could, in
fact, improve the health situation in the Community, can
only be answered by focusing upon the political sphere
[5]. This article presented an analysis of the impact of the
legal basis on the policy-making process. Following our
framework of actor-centred institutionalism, actors' stra-
tegic behaviour is related to both their preferences and the
institutional structure constraining or enabling them.
The policy-making process featured a high conflict level
from its initial stage forward, not only because of differing
views upon the impact of the ban upon smoking behav-
iour, but also, and more importantly, because of distribu-
tive conflicts. At a deeper level, the political difficulties
reflected a conflict between public health and economic
interests. As we showed in our analysis, in the case of
tobacco advertising, the discussion on the legal basis was
used to circumvent debate on how to balance public
health and economic interests.
When the Commission came up with its proposal for a
tobacco advertising ban in 1991, it had to play the treaty-
base game in order to create a proper legal basis. The
Treaty did not provide the Community with the legal
competence to harmonise national regimes to attain a
public health goal. One option was to use article 235, but
this route had a serious drawback. Not only did it reduce
the role of the EP to consultation, but it would also
require unanimity in the Council, which would be politi-
cally unfeasible given the diverging preferences of the
member states. The only option left was article 100a,
which would require a qualified majority in the Council.
The assessment of the proposals' legal basis by the mem-
ber states and the EP varied with their preferences. For a
long time, achieving a qualified majority in the Council
was impossible, because several member states formed a
blocking minority. They mainly argued that the legal basis
was incorrect. They tried to reduce the scope of the pro-
posal and suggested an alternative legal basis that they
knew in advance would never work, because of the
required unanimity. Thus, opposing member states
within the Council tried to change the problem-solving
capacity of the EU from QMV to unanimity. However,
after a new UK government took office, the Council
adopted a common position.
In the EP, opposing MEPs tried to change the legal basis
by asking the Council and the Commission questions.
They also tabled amendments to change the legal basis. If
the EP had indeed amended the Council's common posi-
tion, the co-decision procedure would have resulted in a
conciliation procedure between the EP and the Council.
The actors involved were all aware that conciliation would
most likely fail and result in a non-agreement. In the end,
however, the EP adopted the common position without
amendments.
Our case also illustrates the prominent role of the ECJ, not
only in legal terms, but also in terms of policy-making.
Asking the ECJ to annul Directive 98/43/EC because it had
no correct legal basis was obviously a clear strategic choice
by Germany and a few other dedicated opponents. This
implied that the institutional setting changed from theBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:77 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/77
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mode of joint decisions to the mode of hierarchical direc-
tion. The ruling was remarkable, because the Court did
not confine itself to the conclusion that the Treaty missed
a proper legal basis for the ban. The ECJ went a significant
step further by suggesting a way out. The Commission
seized the opportunity offered by the ECJ and tabled a
new proposal. In 2003, a new directive with a limited
scope was adopted. This directive 'survived' after the ECJ
dismissed the German challenge in December 2006.
The ECJ has been relatively generous in drawing the
boundaries of the internal market treaty basis, including
cases concerning the use of this basis for measures with
perhaps more than an incidental health protection aim.
Whereas the Court departed from this generous construc-
tion of article 100a as the legal basis in its ruling on Direc-
tive 98/43/EC [38], it ruled that the article was the valid
legal basis for Directive 2003/33/EC.
Our case clearly demonstrates that the Commission stra-
tegically used its right of initiative. Despite the consistent
ruling of the ECJ that the choice of a legal basis should
always be a matter of legal principle [12], the strategy of
the Commission reflected a high degree of political prag-
matism. The choice of the legal basis evolved as a strategic
game in itself: it became a permanent contentious issue
throughout the policy-making process. The process was
characterised by repetition of arguments that continued
until the final stage. Beyond the question about the polit-
ical will to adopt a ban on tobacco advertising, there was
the juridical question as to whether the EU was in fact
allowed to adopt such a measure.
The market-making versus market-correcting discussion is
related to a broader question, namely the scope of EU
health regulation in respect to the member states. In fact,
the policy-making process on a tobacco advertising ban is
related to the 'constitutional' foundations of health policy
legislation in the Community.
EU health policies often have to be legitimised by Treaty
articles that have no, or only an indirect link, to health
and healthcare, such as the internal market treaty basis.
However, the absence of a clear cut legal basis for health
policies does not imply that the EU's impact on health is
negligible. The single market exposes almost all areas of
economic importance to competition, including goods
and services related to health(care). In many cases, mar-
ket-making interventions touching upon health – includ-
ing other tobacco-control measures and regulations on
the safety and quality of pharmaceuticals, food and med-
ical devices – also protect consumers. These measures thus
combine an internal market rationale with consumer pro-
tection and public health goals [39]. As long as the inter-
nal market, on its own, constitutes a sustainable legal
basis, a health rationale can be central to internal market
legislation. Thus, a market-correcting intervention is pos-
sible as long as it also has a market-making element. In
the case of tobacco-control measures, this has resulted in
significant action against smoking related morbidity and
mortality [10]. So even though the EU has narrow direct
competences in the field of health, European health pol-
icy is gradually and incrementally taking shape [40] based
on other legal bases.
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